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is exonerated from liability for its
result.) Enterprise and alternative lia-
bility are also alike because the prim-
ary purpose of both theories is to cure
Plaintiff's inability to identify the in-
jurious product, and both accomplish
this purpose by shifting the burden of
proof of causation to Defendants.
Unlike the theory of alternative
liability, however, enterprise liability
emphasizes certain activities of the
industry as a whole; adherence to an
inadequate safety standard and manu-
facture of an identically defective
product." Sheiner, DES and a Pro-
posed Theory of Enterprise Liability,
46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 966. In
enterprise liability the parallel behav-
ior of the Defendants, absent a tacit
agreement is sufficient.
The Plaintiff must prove an insuf-
ficient industrywide safety standard.
This element of proof was established
in Hall where the court determined
that there existed a "national body of
State Tort Law" and then went on to
establish an industrywide safety
standard.
Many of the decisions in the DES
cases show a definite reluctance to
apply this new doctrine of liability. See,
Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super
551, 570, 420 A.2d 1305, at 1315. Lyons
v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, 107 N.J.
Super 183, 193, 406 A.2d 185, at 190.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132,143,607 P.2d 924, at 935. In
fact, none of the DES cases have sup-
ported a recovery based on enterprise
liability. Nevertheless, it could be
argued successfully as its principles
are well-rooted in traditional strict
liability, products liability, and tort
law rules. Plus, with increasing scien-
tific and technological advancements
there will be more and more cases
involving Plaintiffs who will be un-
able to identify the precise man-
ufacturer of the causative agent.
Enterprise liability is an available
avenue that should be argued because
the policy behind permitting the inno-
cent Plaintiff to recover against neg-
ligent Defendants is or should be
weighted more than the burden of
identifying the precise manufacturer
or causation.
Maud is a feminine name derived
from old high German meaning pow-
erful in battle. MAUDD, pronounced
the same, is an acronym for the
Maryland Advocacy Unit for the De-
velopmentally Disabled, a non-profit
corporation that often does battle to
protect and defend the rights of the
developmentally disabled. Develop-
mentally disabled means a person
who has a severe, chronic disability
which occured before the age of 22, is
likely to continue indefinitely and
results in a substantial limitation to
the person's ability to function nor-
mally in society. See: 49 USCA §6001
(7) (1974) for the federal definition of
developmental disability. Unfortunate-
ly some of MAUDD's power or at
least one of its most important wea-
pons has been weakened by a recent
Supreme Court decision.
The existence of MAUDD is man-
dated by an amendment to the De-
velopmental Disabilities and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 USC §6001-6080
(1974), which requires any state re-
ceiving funds under the Act to provide
an independent agency capable of
protecting and advocating the rights
of persons with developmental dis-
abilities, §49 USCA 6012 (1974). In
the past MAUDD has provided a var-
iety of services for the developmen-
tally disabled, including reviewing
state plans, designing volunteer pro-
grams and acting as a resource and
information center, but foremost is
the service MAUDD has provided as
an advocate in individual cases. In
1980 it handled over 1300 cases
involving the right of the developmen-
tally disabled in the areas of education-
al rights, employment discrimination,
transportation and architectural bar-
riers, guardianship, and the rights of
people within institutions. The task
of MAUDD, already hampered by
budget cuts, has been made even
more difficult by a Supreme Court
decision last spring which unfavorably
interpreted the Developmental Dis-
abilities Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act.
The Court in Pennhurst State School v.
Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981),
reversed the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals which has held that the De-
velopmental Disabilities Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 USC §6000
(1974) had created substantive rights
in favor of the mentally retarded and
that those rights were judicially en-
forceable. The case was a class action
brought by a minor retarded resident
of Pennhurst State School and Hospi-
tal, and all persons who have been or
may become residents of Pennhurst.
The findings of fact were undisputed:
the conditions at Pennhurst were
dangerous and inhumane, with the
residents often physically abused or
drugged by staff members. The Dis-
trict Court had found that the physi-
cal, intellectual and emotional skills of
some of the residents had actually
deteriorated at Pennhurst.
The plaintiffs claimed there were
various state, federal and constitu-
tional violations including the denial
of rights confirmed by the Develop-
mental Disabilities Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act. In addition to seeking
injunctive and monetary relief, the
plaintiffs urged that Pennhurst be
closed and that community living ar-
rangements-smaller less isolated
residences where retarded people are
treated as much as possible like non-
retarded people-be established for
its residents. The District Court found
for the plaintiffs and ordered that
Pennhurst eventually be closed and,
that individual treatment plans be




developed for each resident and that
conditions at Pennhurst be improved
in the interim, 446 F. Supp. 1295
(E.D. PA. 1977). The Court of Appeals
substantially affirmed the District
Court's order but avoided the other
federal and state claims and rested its
decision on the Developmental Dis-
abilities Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act. The Court of Appeals did not
require Pennhurst to close but re-
manded the case to District Court for
individual determinations as to the
appropriateness of an improved Penn-
hurst for each patient and instructed
the court to engage in a presumption
in favor of placing individuals in com-
munity living arrangements, 612 F.
2d 84 (1979). Pennhurst appealed.
The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and narrowed the issue to one of
statutory construction: "Did Congress
intend in §6010 to create enforceable
rights and obligations?" 101 S. Ct.
at 1536.
The relevant statute titled "Con-
gressional finds respecting right of
developmentally disabled" provide in
part that:
(1) Persons with developmental
disabilities have a right to appro-
priate treatment, service, and re-
habilitation for such disabilities.
(2) The treatment, service and
habilitation for a person with de-
velopmental disabilities should
be designed to maximize the de-
velopmental potential of the per-
son and should be provided in
the setting that is least restric-
tive of the person's personal
liability.
(3) The Federal Government and
the State both have an obligation
to assure that public funds are
not provided to an institutional
or other residential program for
persons with developmental dis-
abilities that-
(A) does not provide treat-
ment service, and habilitation
which is appropriate to the
needs of such persons; or
(B) does not meet the follow-
ing minimum standards.
(4) All programs for persons with
developmental disabilities should
meet standards which are de-
signed to assure the most favor-
able possible outcome for those
served.. .42 USC §6010 (1974)
Chief Justice Burger in the major-
ity opinion found that §6010 "does no
more than express a congressional
preference for certain kinds of treat-
ment." 101 S. Ct. at 1540. He reasoned
since there was not express reference
to §5 of the 14th Amendment that
the Developmental Disabilities Assis-
tance and Bill of Rights Act was
enacted under the authority of the
Spending Power alone.
The Court likened legislation en-
acted pursuant to the Spending Power
that requires States to comply with
federally imposed conditions, to that
of a "contract." Accordingly, the con-
ditions must be unambiguous so the
State may voluntarily and knowingly
accept the terms of the "contract."
The Court found §6010 lacking any
language suggesting it is a "condition"
for receiving federal funds under the
act, 101 S. Ct. 1542. Chief Justice
Burger pointed to other sections of
the statute which imposed conditions
for receiving funds in clear terms, as
in §§6006, 6009, 6011, 6012, 6063,
and 6067. Burger continued by accus-
ing the Third Circuit of failing to rec-
ognize the well settled distinction
between Congressional "encourage-
ment" of state programs and the
imposition of binding obligations on
the states. He compared the statutes
here with the Medicaid Statute con-
sidered in Harris v. McRae, 488 U.S.
297 (1980) and concluded both were
"designed as a co-operative program
of shared responsibilities, not as a
device for the Federal Government to
compel a State to provide services
that Congress itself is unwilling to
fund." However, he failed to mention
that here there was no equivalent
Hyde Amendment preventing federal
funding or that the rights being as-
serted were legislated by Congress
and not created by judicial fiat.
The majority also cited another
case as an example of when Congress
attempts to encourage rather than
mandate rights for the handicapped.
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397 (1979), the Supreme
Court reversed the 4th Circuit Court
of Appeals, holding that a hearing-
impaired student, otherwise qualified,
could not be denied admission to South-
eastern's Nursing Program. The Court
of Appeals had found that §504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
794 (1973), required affirmative con-
duct on the part of Southeastern to
modify its program to accommodate
the disabilities of applicants. How-
ever, the Supreme Court reviewed
the other provisions of the Act and
concluded that when Congress in-
tended to require affirmative efforts
it knew how to do so. It pointed to
sections requiring affirmative action
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programs in hiring by the Federal
Government 29 U.S.C. 791 (b) (1973),
and by contractors to the Federal
Government 29 U.S.C. §793 (1973)
and then pointed out that State agen-
cies are only "encouraged" to institute
such programs 29 U.S.C. §791(c)
(1973). Therefore, the school could
not be required to admit a hearing-
impaired student to its nursing pro-
gram.
The Court used the same analysis
in both Pennhurst and Southeastern. The
Court looked to other provisions of
the statute in question to find express
conditions for affirmative obligations
and compared the language creating
express conditions with these in the
provision being reviewed. In Southeast-
ern the comparison was simple because
the statute by express language only
"encourage[d]" state agencies to de-
velop affirmative action program. Id.
The statute in Pennhurst does not con-
tain a clear statement by Congress
that its intention was only to 'encour-
age' the States to abide by the Bill of
Rights Section. Section 6010 (3) clear-
ly places an obligation on both Federal
and State governments to assure that
public funds are not spent on pro-
grams that do not meet certain re-
quirements, yet the Court found the
language to be merely prefatory.
As if holding that the language of
Section 6010 was only "wishful think-
ing" on the part of Congress was not
handicapping enough, Burger went
on to another crippling blow by attack-
ing the right to a private course of
action under other provisions con-
tained in the Act. That issue is on
remand to the Third Circuit, but if
the Court of Appeals follows Burger's
lead by upholding his view, The Devel-
opmental Disabilities Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act may be without a
right to a private cause of action or
the remedy may be limited to enjoin-
ing the Federal Government from
providing funds under the Act to the
offending State. This would create
further injuries to the supposed bene-
ficiaries of the Act.
MAUDD, as a result of the holding
in Pennhurst, may be hampered in its
current attempt to seek individual-
ized treatment programs in the least
restrictive setting for the so called
"Sachs" population. The "Sachs" popu-
lation was named after Maryland
Attorney General Steven Sachs when
he disclosed in a public letter that
many retarded persons were illegally
confined in hospitals for the mentally
ill. Letter from Steven Sachs to Presi-
dent of Mental Health Assoc. of Mary-
land (August 16, 1979). A suit was
filed by MAUDD on behalf of the
Sachs population, which centered on
the evaluation and placement process
to be used to relocate the Sachs popu-
lation, Knott v. Highes, No. 80-2832 (D.
Md. filed Oct. 18, 1980). As a result a
State Plan was negotiated. However
implementation of this plan, as a
result of Pennhurst, will not require the
consideration of Section 6010.
Although MAUDD and its sister
units in other states remain frus-
trated in their attempts to secure
individual treatment plans in least
restrictive settings for retarded citi-
zens now institutionalized, they are
hopeful that the Supreme Court will
set forth some guidelines concerning
the constitutional rights of the invol-
untarily committed mentally retarded.
The Supreme Court has granted cer-
tiorari in Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d
147 (3rd Cir. 1980) cert. granted, 101
S. Ct. 2313 (1981) (No. 80-1429). This
case involves another resident of Penn-
hurst who was shackled by the staff,
beaten by other patients, and never
offered appropriate rehabilitation
treatment. A favorable decision would
enable MAUDD to remain 'powerful
in battle'.
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